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FIAT MONETARY REGIME 
AND COOPERATION THEORY
Fiat Monetary Regime is a serious problem for world policy makers. A 
major obstacle to the operation and indeed survival of this “current unprec-
edented fi at monetary regime” or system are the member nation-states with 
competing and often confl icting agendas. In short, nationalism may simply 
overwhelm the monetary regime.
Is it possible to modify existing nation-state institutions and policies so 
that each participant nation-state in the fi at monetary regime acts as in a free 
market to promote an end that was no part of its intention, as though led by 
the Smithian invisible hand? For useful insight this paper turns to the theory 
of cooperation.
Key Words: Fiat Monetary Regime, theory of cooperation, strategies of 
cooperation, “Tit-for-Tat” strategy, nation-state, sovereignty.
The Issue
The operation and indeed survival of the unprecedented fi at monetary regime 
depends on its nation-state participants. Historically, governments of nation-states 
do attempt to secure various domestic goals by unsustainable infl ationary policies. 
Governments pursuing accommodating monetary and fi scal policies should be 
on notice that they can not count on being supported by other countries. Clearly, 
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they would have to be tougher in allowing, for instance, cost-push or wage-price 
spiral infl ation to have its normal effects in causing unemployment and less than 
capacity operation of their economies. It would be equally clear to employers and 
unions that they could not count on the government to support their infl ationary 
actions by infl ationary monetary and fi scal policy.
How are countries persuaded to behave consistently and predictably and not 
attempt to achieve temporary domestic or international advantages at the expense 
of another country? Is it possible to modify existing institutions and policies so 
that each participant acts as in a free market to promote an end that was no part of 
their intention as if led by the Smithian invisible hand? For suggested insights we 
turn to cooperation theory.1
Cooperation Theory
Can a worldwide managed fi at monetary regime operate without the benefi t 
of conscious action by planners and governments in an area where independent 
egoistic nations and domestic special interests face each other in a state of near 
anarchy? Can these diverse domestic and international monetary interests evolve 
reliable cooperative strategies so as to provide an anchor to the long-term price 
level? Can cooperation emerge in a world of diverse domestic monetary interests 
and sovereign states? In short, can cooperation evolve out of uncooperation? Spe-
cifi cally, how can cooperation get started at all? Can cooperation strategies sur-
vive better than their rivals? Which cooperative strategies will do best, and how 
will they come to predominate? As it turns out, our cooperation theory can help 
us in gauging the utility of such monetary reform proposals as a monetary growth 
rule in promoting cooperation, and indeed, the likely success of the reform itself 
and the viability of a managed fi at monetary regime.
Many of the problems facing these nations and domestic monetary interests 
take the form of an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.2 In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
1 George Macesich, Monetary Reform and Cooperation Theory (New York: Praeger Publish-
ers, 1989); George Macesich, Money and Monetary Regimes: Struggle for Monetary Supremacy 
(Westport, CT, London: Praeger Publishers, 2002); George Macesich, World Banking and Finance: 
Cooperation Versus Confl ict (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984). I draw on these studies in what 
follows.
2 First formulated in about 1950 by Merril M. Flood and Melvin Dresher and later formal-
ized by Albert W. Tucker, according to Douglas R. Hofstadter, “Metamagical Themas: Computer 
Tournaments of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Suggest How Cooperation Evolved.” Scientifi c American 
May 1983: 16–23. Prisoner’s Dilemma derives its name from a game that has no satisfying solu-
tion, that is, whatever choice is recommended by “rational considerations” has something wrong 
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two individuals (or nations) can either cooperate or defect. The payoff to a player 
is in terms of the effect the action will have. No matter what the other does, the 
selfi sh choice of defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. If both defect, 
however, both do worse than if they cooperated.
For purposes of illustration let us assume “A” (developed-creditor nations) 
and “B” (developing-debtor nations) in Figure 1 agree to trade. Both are satisfi ed 
as to the amounts they will be receiving. Assume further that for some reason the 
exchange is to take place in secret. Both argue to place money in a designated 
location. Let us assume that neither A nor B will ever meet again nor have further 
dealings.
Figure 1
Prisoner’s Dilemma (A - Developed/Creditor Nations)
B = Developing Debtor Nations;
the game is defi ned by: T > R > P > S and R > (S + T) / 2.)
C
Cooperation
R - 3, 3
Mutual Cooperation




T = 5, 0
Temptation to Defect
P = 1, 1
Punishment for Mutual 
Defection
Now if both A and B carry out their agreement both stand to gain. It is also 
obvious that if neither A nor B carried out the agreement, neither would have 
with it, in spite of the fact that nothing remains unknown about the situation. In other words, the 
chooser cannot do better by fi nding out more; hence the dilemma. Robert Axelrod and William 
D. Hamilton, “The Evolution of Cooperation.” Science March 27, 1981: 1390–1396; Douglas R. 
Hofstadter, “Metamagical Themas,” Scientifi c American May 1983: 16–26; Anatol Rapoport and 
A. M. Chammah, Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965); D. Luce 
and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976): 94–102; M. Cohen, 
T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon, eds., War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1974); B. Balassa and R. Nelson, eds., Economic Progress, Private Values, and Public Policy: 
Essays in Honor of William Felner (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977); M. 
Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976); Robert Axelrod, Evolu-
tion of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of 
Social Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Andrew Schotter and Gerhard 
Schwodiauer, “Economies and the Theory of Games: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
June 1980:  479–527.
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what it wanted. It is equally obvious that if only one carried out its end of the bar-
gain—say A—B would receive something for nothing since they will never again 
meet nor have further dealings. There is  this incentive for both A and B to leave 
nothing. As a result neither A nor B get what they initially wanted. Does the logic 
present cooperation? That is the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma can be made more quantitative and in that 
form studies by the methods of game theory and computer simulation. In order to 
do this we build a “payoff matrix” presenting hypothetical values for the various 
alternatives such as in Figure 1.
In this matrix, mutual cooperation by A and B yields to both parties 3 points. 
Mutual defection yields to both 0 points. If A cooperates but B does not, B gets 
5 points because it is better to get something for nothing. The number 3 is called 
the “reward for cooperation” R. The number 1 is called the “punishment” or P. 
The number 5 is T for “termination,” and zero is 5, the “sucker’s payoff.” The 
conditions necessary for the matrix to represent a Prisoner’s Dilemma are the fol-
lowing:
         (1)
          (2)
The fi rst condition (1) says that it is better to defect no matter what the other 
side does. The second condition (2) in effect guarantees that if A and B get locked 
into an out phase alteration, for example, A cooperates but B defects in one period 
and B cooperates but A defects in the second period, A will not do better. In fact, 
A will do worse than if A cooperated in each period.
If A and B will never meet again (unlikely situation in our example) the only 
appropriate solution indicated by the game is to defect always. This strategy is 
correct even though both could do better if they cooperated. Thus in the case of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma played only once, to defect is always the best strategy.
In the case of our iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game where the same two 
participants may meet more than once, a much greater set of options is available. 
Strategy would include a decision rule that determines the probability of coopera-
tion or defection as a formation of the history of interactions thus far. If, however, 
there is a known number of interactions between a pair of individuals, to defect 
always is still evolutionarily stable (for example, individuals using the strategy of 
defection cannot do better by another strategy). The reason is that the defection 
T > R > S
T S R+ <
2
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on the last interaction would be optimal for both sides. And, of course, so would 
defection on the next to the last interaction and on back to the fi rst.
On the other hand, the number of interactions is not fi xed in advance but 
given by some probability, W, that after the fi rst interaction the same two individu-
als (nations) will meet again, other strategies accrue evolutionarily stable as well. 
Indeed, when W is suffi ciently great, there is no single best strategy regardless of 
the behavior of the other in the population. The matter, however, is not hopeless.
In fact, Axelrod and Hamilton demonstrate that there is a strategy that is 
stable, robust, and viable.3 Accordingly, evolution of cooperation can be concep-
tualized in terms of these separate questions:
1. Robustness. What type of strategy can thrive in a variegated environment 
composed of others using a wide variety of more or less sophisticated 
strategies.
2. Stability. Under what conditions can such a strategy, once fully estab-
lished, resist invasion by mutant strategies?
3. Initial viability. Even if a strategy is robust and stable, how can I t ever get 
a foothold in an environment that is predominantly noncooperative?
The authors submitted various strategies to a computer tournament drawing 
upon contributors in game theory from economics, mathematics, political science, 
and sociology. The result of the tournament was that the best strategy was one of 
cooperation in the fi rst more and then doing what the other player did on the pre-
ceding move. Thus “tit for tat” is a strategy for cooperation based on reciprocity.
The robustness of “tit for tat” is reported by the authors as dependent on 
three features: It was  never the fact to defect, it was provocable into retaliation by 
a defection of the other, and it was forgiving after just one set retaliation. Tit for 
tat displaced all other rules. It is a robust strategy that can thrive in a variegated 
environment.4
The authors then demonstrate that once “tit for tat” has gone to fi xation it 
can resist invasion by any possible mutant strategy provided that individuals who 
interact have a suffi ciently large probability, W, of meeting again.
Since “tit for tat” is not the only strategy that can be evolutionarily stable, 
it raises the problem of how an evolutionary trend to cooperative behavior could 
ever have started in the fi rst place. Axelrod and Hamilton provide several illustra-
tions where benefi ts of cooperation can be harvested by groups of closely-related 
individuals.
3 Axelrod and Hamilton, “Evolution of Cooperation.” 1395.
4 Ibid., p. 1393. The strategy of “tit for tat” was submitted to the tournament by Anatol Rapo-
port.
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Clustering can also lead to a “tit for tat” strategy even when virtually every-
one is using an all D (Defection) strategy. Suppose that a small group of individu-
als is using “tit for tat” and that a certain proportion, p, of the interactions of the 
members of the cluster are with other members of the chester. Then the average 
score attained by members of the cluster using “tit for tat” strategy is
          (3)
If the members of the cluster provide a negligible proportion of the interac-
tions for the other individuals, then the score attained by those using D is still P/(1 
- w). When p and w are large enough, a cluster of “tit for tat” individuals can then 
become initially viable in an environment composed overwhelmingly of all D.
Can the reverse happen? That is, once a strategy of “tit for tat” becomes 
established can it be displaced? According to the authors the answer is no. This is 
because the score achieved by the strategy, that comes in a cluster is a weighted 
average of how it does with others of its kind and with the predominant strategy. 
Each of these components is less than or equal to the score achieved by “tit for 
tat.” Thus the strategy arriving in a cluster can not intrude on “tit for tat.” In other 
words, when w is large enough to make “tit for tat,” an evolutionarily stable strat-
egy, it can resist intrusion by any cluster of any other strategy.
In sum, cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in a predominantly 
uncooperative environment and can defend itself once fully established argue 
Axelrod and Hamilton. They underscore that the gear wheels of social evolution 
have a ratchet.5
It is noteworthy for our purpose that “tit for tat” won the various tournament 
games not because it managed to beat the other players but by eliciting behavior 
from the other player that allowed both to do well. Indeed, it was so consistent in 
generating initially rewarding results that it achieved a higher overall score than 
any other strategy in the tournament.
So-called “non-nice” or tricky strategies designed to sound out how much 
an opponent “minded” being defeated against typically backfi red causing severe 
breakdown of trust. In other words, attempts to use defection in a game to “fl ush 
out” an opponent’s weak spots turns out to be very costly. Indeed, it proved more 
profi table to have a policy of cooperation as often as possible, together with a 
willingness to retaliate swiftly in a restrained and forgiving manner.
Furthermore, straightforwardness and simplicity is the best approach. Being 
so complex as to be incomprehensible is very dangerous indeed. Too complex a 
5 Ibid., p. 1394.
p R w p S WP w/ /1 1 1−( ) + −( ) + −( ){ }( )
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strategy can appear as chaotic. The use of a random strategy can appear as one that 
is unresponsive to the other player. An unresponsive strategy provides no incen-
tive for the other player to cooperate with you.
The signifi cance of these results for the fi at monetary regime and reform is 
clear. Self-seeking and byzantine strategies by individual nations or groups of na-
tions will have very little to show for their efforts.
Among the other important lessons for our monetary discussion derived 
from Axelrod’s tournament efforts is that previously game theories did not take 
their analysis far enough. That is, it is important to minimize echo effects in an 
environment of mutual power. He argues that a sophisticated analysis calls for 
going “three levels deep.” The fi rst level is the direct effect of a choice. Since a 
defection always earns more than cooperation, this is easy. The second level is 
the indirect effect, which takes into account that the other side may or may not 
punish a defection. The effect in the third level is the fact that in responding to the 
defection of the other side, one may be repeating or even amplifying one’s own 
exploitative choice. Thus a single defection may be successful when considered 
for its direct effects and perhaps even for its secondary effects. The tertiary ef-
fects, however, may be the real costs when one’s own single defection turns into 
unending mutual recriminations. In effect, many of the players actually wound up 
punishing themselves, the other player simply serving as a mechanism to delay 
the self-punishment by a few moves.
In essence, there is a lot to be learned about coping in an environment of mu-
tual power. Indeed, Axelrod  reports that many expert strategists from economics, 
political science, mathematics, sociology, and psychology made the systematic 
error of being to competitive for their own good, not forgiving enough, and too 
pessimistic about the responsiveness of the other side.
In a non-zero sum world a nation does not have to do better than another na-
tion to do well for itself. The more player nations interacting the better. As long as 
A does well it is alright if the others do as well or a little better. It is pointless for 
A to be envious of the success of another country because Prisoner’s Dilemma of 
long duration success of the others is virtually a prerequisite of A doing well for 
itself.
Clearly this principle holds, for example, for debtor and creditor countries—
an important issue in the ongoing dialogue over monetary reform and the fi at 
monetary regime. A country that borrows from another can expect that the loan 
will be mutually benefi cial. There is no point in the borrower being envious of the 
creditor’s terms and interest. Any attempt to reduce it through an uncooperative 
practice, such as not making interest and principal payments on time as agreed, 
will only encourage the creditor to take retaliatory action. Retaliatory action could 
take many forms, often without being explicitly labeled as punishment, including 
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poorer credit ratings, less prompt deliveries of needed materials, fewer discounts, 
and in general less favorable market conditions for the debtor country’s goods and 
services. In short, the retaliation could make the loan quite expensive. Instead of 
worrying  about the relative profi ts of the creditor, the debtor should worry about 
whether another borrowing strategy would be better. For instance, it can lift do-
mestic restrictions on interest paid on savings and bank deposits, thereby mobiliz-
ing greater domestic savings that reduce external borrowing requirements.
The signifi cance of the environment for the endogenous evolution of institu-
tions á la Hayek are the results reported by Axelrod and others in the “ecological 
tournaments.”6 The tournament consists not only of single subjective replay but 
also of an entire cascade of hypothetical replays, each one’s environment deter-
mined by the preceding replay. In particular, if you take a program’s score in 
a tournament as a measure of its “fi tness,” and if you interpret fi tness to mean 
“member of progeny in the next generation,” and fi nally if you let next generation 
mean “next tournament,” then what you get is that each tournament’s results de-
termine the environment of the next tournament. This type of iterated tournament 
is called “ecological” because it stimulates ecological adaptation (the shifting of a 
fi xed set of species populations according to their mutually defi ned and dynami-
cally developing environment) as contracted with the mutation-oriented aspects of 
evolution, where new species can come into existence.
Carrying on the ecological tournament generation after generation results in 
the environment gradually changing. At the start both poor and good programs or 
strategies are equally represented. As the tournament goes on the poorer programs 
drop out while the good ones remain. The rank order of the good ones now will 
change since the fi eld of competitors has changed.
In short, success breeds success only if the successful programs are permit-
ted to interact. In contrast, if the success of some programs is due mostly to their 
ability to exploit less successful programs, then as these exploit prone programs 
are gradually squeezed out, the exploiter’s base of support is eroded and it too will 
bail out, and indeed, as Axelrod points out, playing with rules that  do not score 
well is eventually self-defeating. No being nice may look promising at the start, 
but in the long run the effect is to destroy the very environment upon which its 
success depends.
Cooperation based on reciprocity can gain a foothold through at least two 
different mechanisms. One is through Kinship or closely related individuals and/
or institutions. For instance, banks and the debtor-creditor relationship between 
developing and developed countries is such a relationship.
6 The discussion in the following two paragraphs draws on Hofstadter, “Metamagical The-
mas,” pp 24–25.
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A second mechanism to overcome a strategy of total defection (All D) is for 
the instant strategy (cooperation) to arrive in such a cluster so that they provide 
a nontrivial proportion of the interaction each has. In addition to the debt/credit 
relationship between developed and developing nations, the existensive trade re-
lations that now make for increasing world interdependence provides such a clus-
ter.
As reported by Axelrod and Hamilton a computer tournament approach will 
demonstrate that a strategy of “tit for tat” will fare better than alternative strate-
gies. It is robust. It does well in a variety of circumstances. It is stable, especially 
against a wide variety of mutuant strategies. Cooperation can indeed prosper. It 
can emerge in a world of egoists without central control by starting with a cluster 
of individuals/nations who rely on reciprocity.
In short, advice given to players of the Prisoner’s Dilemma might also serve 
world bankers as well as national leaders, including monetary authorities and oth-
ers, in developing and developed nations in dealing with the current opportuni-
ties before the world. Don’t be envious, don’t be fi rst to defect, reciprocate both 
defection and cooperation and don’t be too clever. Those guidelines will serve the 
participant nations in the current fi at monetary regime.
To be sure, allowance must be made in the application of our Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game to ideology, bureaucratic policies, and quality of leadership. Nev-
ertheless, the insights are very useful as this study demonstrates. Our process of 
understanding and approach to problems of cooperation is enhanced by the knowl-
edge that mutual cooperation can indeed emerge without central control or plan 
by starting with a cluster of units that rely on reciprocity. When it is learned that 
X will lead to Y, and Y is felt to be desirable, there is an inclination to encourage 
Y but not prohibiting it. The process of trial and error in dealing with such global 
issues as the current fi at monetary regime, monetary reform, trade, and political 
issues is slow and painful. The conditions for cooperation and mutually rewarding 
strategies based on reciprocity are time.
Our theory provides us with a good example of the endogenous unplanned 
aspect of social  institutions that is counter to the usual social-scientifi c views of 
institutions as planned or designed mechanisms given exogenously to the theorist. 
It is F. A. Hayek who suggested research into the unplanned or unconscious inter-
action of social agents in order to investigate the spontaneous or unintended social 
institutions they create.7
7 F. A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution in Science (New York: Free Press, 1955). See also 
Schotter, The Economic Theory, and Martin Shubik, “A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: 
Fiat Money and Noncooperative Equilibrium in a Classical Economy.” International Journal of 
Game Theory 7, No. 1, 1971/1972: 243–268.
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Indeed, it is a major theme of Hayek’s social philosophy that emergent or 
spontaneous outcomes, or more descriptively, the unintended consequences of hu-
man action are both effi cient and desirable.8 It may well be that the marketplace is 
fi nding ways to accomplish changes in the world’s monetary regime without the 
benefi t of conscious action by government.
The theory of cooperation gives insight into the importance of credibility for 
monetary authorities in their operation of the fi at monetary regime. Credibility 
can be achieved through the pursuit by monetary authorities of a “nice strategy,” 
that is, one of “tit for tat” as in our illustration. Such a strategy–as we have dis-
cussed–is simple and straightforward.
On the other hand, playing with non-nice strategies is eventually self-defeat-
ing. Not being nice may look promising at the start but in the long-run the effect 
is to destroy the very environment upon which its success depends. A non-nice 
strategy is one of discretionary monetary policies, since they do depend upon am-
biguity and duplicity for their success by exploiting the short-term non-neutrality 
of money. These policies are so complex as to be incomprehensible. Indeed, they 
are so complex as to appear chaotic. They provide no incentive for constructive 
cooperation on the part of other players in the economy.
Our earlier discussion of the ecological tournament underscored the impor-
tance of a changing environment based on “good” programs or strategies. Our 
discussion also underscored the importance of minimizing echo effects in an envi-
ronment of mutual cooperation. It is as important to avoid the systematic error of 
too competitive a strategy as it is to avoid being to pessimistic about the respon-
siveness of the other side and not forgiving enough. In effect, the practitioners 
of non-nice strategy in our ecological tournament actually wound up punishing 
themselves, the other player simply serving as a mechanism to delay the self-pun-
ishment by a few moves. On the domestic level this is sharply illustrated in the 
American monetary experience in the nineteenth century and the internal struggle 
for monetary supremacy between banks and government. On the international 
level we have the examples of the French Indemnity of 1871 and the German 
reparations of 1919.
Although the lessons of history are seldom unequivocal, it is useful, nonethe-
less, to turn to past experience as we have in this study to underscore the impor-
8 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1960); F. A. Hayek, 
Law Legislation and Liberty, Rules and Order, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); 
and Volz, Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). To be sure, Hayek’s 
view of the endogenous nature of institutions takes place within a specifi ed environment namely, 
one where general rules are adhered to. The environment guarantees that only effi cient institutions 
orders-outcomes will emerge. See Roger A. Arnold, “Hayek and Institutional Evolution.” The Jour-
nal of Libertarian Studies 4, No. 4 (Fall 1980): 341–352.
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tance and consistency of our theoretical discussion. Though other episodes come 
readily to mind, there such historical episodes serve to illustrate our discussion. 
One is the American experience during the turbulent 1830s and 1840s and the 
environment of distrust created by the political struggle for monetary supremacy 
carried on by the government and banks. The period is characterized by the Bank 
War, distribution of surplus revenue (Deposit Act of 1836), the Specie Circular, 
and capital fl aws.
The second is provided by the French Indemnity Payment of 1871, which 
set going non-nice strategies that actually wound up punishing their practitio-
ners in the post–World War I era. The third illustrations the German reparations 
payments issued during the post–World War I years. This episode considerably 
disturbed the international scene of the 1920s and 1930s. In good measure the 
reparation issue so embittered the Germans (as the earlier indemnity payment of 
1871 embittered the French) that they became ever more receptive to extremists 
whose claims and solutions culminated in World War II. This stands in marked 
contrast to American’s “nice” strategy embedded in the Marshall Plan of 1947 for 
the reconstruction of post–World War II Europe. The Soviet Union and its friends 
declined all invitations to participate, embracing instead a non-nice strategy that 
in good measure has served to punish its practitioners.
